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S INCE THE WRIGHT brothers lifted off at Kitty Hawk, all pi-
lots have encountered turbulent atmospheric conditions at
some time or another. Courts, as well, have grappled with cases
involving injuries sustained by passengers as a result of turbu-
lence encounters since the 1930s. Although we have come a
long way this century in understanding the phenomena of the
effect of air turbulence on aircraft, determining airline liability
for the injuries sustained by a passenger injured during the
course of a turbulence encounter, particularly clear air turbu-
lence, is still perplexing and remains the focus of a great deal of
litigation.
The litigation scenario usually involves a passenger injured in
an unannounced turbulence encounter. The claim is denied,
and the airline disclaims liability on one of two grounds: first,
that the turbulence could not have been reasonably anticipated,
or second, that the passenger failed to follow in-flight safety pre-
cautions or abide by timely warnings. The injuries caused by a
turbulence encounter range from minor to catastrophic.
As recently as October 7, 1999, a jury sitting in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York ren-
dered a $2,225,000 verdict allocated among thirteen plaintiff
* Marc S. Moller is a partner with the law firm of Kreindler & Kreindler in
New York City. Lori B. Lasson is an associate with the firm.
The authors are indebted to Michael Smith, certified consulting meteorologist
and principal owner of WeatherData, Inc., 245 North Waco Street, Suite 310,
Wichita, Kansas, for his assistance in the preparation of this article. Mr. Smith
has been qualified and has testified as an expert in aviation accident litigation
including, for example, the recent litigation arising out of the crash of USAir
Flight 1016 in Charlotte, North Carolina on July 2, 1994. WeatherData, Inc. is
engaged in the business of providing meteorological and other weather informa-
tion to the media and business enterprises on a contract basis.
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passengers (ten adults and three children), represented by Krei-
ndler & Kreindler. The plaintiffs suffered emotional distress as
a result of twenty eight seconds of severe turbulence ranging
from positive two gs to negative one half g on American Airlines
Flight 58 from Los Angeles to JFK Airport on June 26, 1995.
The plaintiffs claimed that the American Airlines pilots should
have circumnavigated a thunderstorm in the area and should
have illuminated the seatbelt sign prior to encountering the tur-
bulence. The flight required an emergency landing in Chicago.
American Airlines conceded liability on the eve of trial. Half of
the plaintiffs suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and
the average award ranged between $150,000 and $215,000.1
In January 1997, two TWAjets trailing each other and bound
for St. Louis hit severe turbulence over Missouri's Bootheel. 2
The pilots of each plane declared emergencies. A flight attend-
ant at the rear of one of the aircraft was thrown into the ceiling,
causing her head to burst through one of the panels. A passen-
ger and four other flight attendants were treated for bumps and
bruises.
In March 1997, Mexicana Airlines Flight 199, en route from
Mexico to Chicago's O'Hare Airport, flew into clear air turbu-
lence injuring four crew members and nineteen passengers.'
Also in March 1997, United Flight 2370, on its descent into Bur-
bank, encountered severe air turbulence caused by the Santa
Ana Winds.4
"Center," the first officer radioed from the careening flight deck,
"do you, ah, have any indication how far down this goes?" Good
God, I thought, we're going to crash in the Northridge Fashion
Center. We didn't, of course, but more than a few ashen souls
walked off that plane convinced they'd cheated death.'
Not so lucky were the passengers on board American Airlines
Flight 242 on July 10, 1997 who sustained injuries in a turbu-
1 See Spielberg v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 4763, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11702 (N.Y. August 8, 1997).
2 See Christopher Carey, 2 TWA Flights Hit Turbulence; 6 Injured, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Jan. 30, 1997, at 10A, available in 1997 WL 3320965.
s See Andrew Buchanan, Turbulence Adds a Shake Up Call to Air Travelers, CHI-
CAGO TRIBUNE, Mar. 3, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 3525742.
4 See Michael Walker, Angel Flight Turbulence, Los ANGELES TIMES MAG., Mar. 2,




lence encounter.6 Even worse was United Airlines Flight 826 on
December 28, 1997, in which one passenger was killed and ap-
proximately one hundred others were injured.7
There have been so many injuries caused by turbulence that
the investigators for the General Accounting Office (GAO), the
investigative arm of Congress, conducted an analysis of more
than 22,000 accidents from 1987 through 1996 for which the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) had made find-
ings of probable cause. More than twenty-five percent of these
accidents were weather related, and turbulence was the most fre-
quent factor or cause cited in accidents involving major air
carriers.'
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) provides other
enlightening statistics concerning the frequency and potentially
fatal consequences of turbulence accidents:
" Approximately fifty-eight airline passengers are injured by
turbulence annually while not wearing seat belts. From 1981
through December 1997, major carriers reported 342 cases
of turbulence resulting in 3 deaths, 80 serious personal inju-
ries and 769 minor injuries;
" Of the eighty passengers seriously injured, approximately
seventy-three were not wearing their seatbelts, and at least
two of the three death cases involved passengers who were
not wearing their seatbelts;
* Generally, two-thirds of the turbulence related accidents oc-
curred above thirty thousand feet. In 1997, however, ap-
proximately half of the accidents occurred above thirty
thousand feet.9
6 See The National Transportation Safety Board, Aviation Accidents, NTSB Iden-
tification FTW971A261 (July 10, 1997) <http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/FrW/
lnarr_97A261.htm>.
7 See Mark Hosenball, A Fatal Jolt over the Pacific, NEWSWEEK, January 12, 1998, at
34.
8 NTSB Reporter, Vol. 16, No. 7, July 1998. According to the GAO report,
71.4% of weather related air carrier accidents were caused by turbulence and
65% of air carrier injuries were caused by turbulence. Id., at 3, 6.
9 FAA, Facts About Turbulence (visited Aug. 29, 1999) <http://www.faa.gov/apa/
turb/Facts/fact.htn>. These statistics are provided as part of "Turbulence Hap-
pens," the FAA multimedia campaign to educate the public about turbulence, its
consequences, and methods to avoid injury.
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In 1996, the FAA launched a nationwide safety campaign to pro-
mote the use of safety belts throughout flights in an effort to
prevent turbulence related injuries.1"
With that as background, this article addresses the handling
of an air turbulence case. One point bears emphasis at the out-
set: the passenger can win his case if he can establish by a rea-
sonable preponderance of the evidence that the turbulence was
foreseeable and that his injury could have been prevented,
avoided, or minimized. Most air turbulence injuries are avoida-
ble, and airlines will be liable if pilots fail to take reasonable
precautions to detect and avoid meteorological conditions in
which a potential injury-causing turbulence encounter is likely.
First and foremost, lawyers must understand how to deter-
mine whether a turbulence case exists in the first place. They
must learn how to identify the nature of the turbulence in order
to assess whether the encounter was foreseeable. Among the
many questions to ask are: was the turbulence windshear, was it
microburst, was it related to a thunderstorm, was it associated
with precipitation, what time of year did it happen, where did it
happen, and what did the weather radar disclose or what could
it have disclosed if used properly? They must explore in depth
the weather conditions that prevailed in the vicinity of the tur-
bulence encounter as well as along the flight path before and
after the encounter. They must determine whether the cockpit
crew should have been able to either avoid the turbulence alto-
gether or warn the passengers in advance of the lurching of the
aircraft to avoid or minimize any injury or death. They must
search for the experiences of other aircraft traveling in the gen-
eral vicinity of the one in question.
What may look like a clear air turbulence case at first glance,
in which the defendant can hide behind the claim of an una-
voidable accident or act of God, may well turn out to be an
avoidable incident had the crew paid proper heed to the prevail-
ing weather and warned the passengers. Increasing awareness
of the threat and damage of unexpected turbulence has caused
many airlines to mandate the use of seatbelts at all times passen-
gers are seated and has prompted the recent Federal Aviation
Regulation requiring airlines to instruct passengers to keep
10 See FAA Launches Education Campaign to Raise Awareness About Turbulence, FAA
NEws RELEASE (U.S. Dep't of Transp.), Dec. 17, 1996, available in 1996 WL




their seat belts fastened while seated.1' This regulation's pur-
pose, of course, is to promote safety. But while certainly not
conclusive, the regulation also provides some measure of a liti-
gation defense. Passengers, however, are entitled and expected
to leave their seats, and turbulence caused injuries can be sus-
tained even by seated passengers.
II. A LESSON IN METEOROLOGY: UNDERSTANDING
THE BASICS OF TURBULENCE
The three principal causes of turbulence are convective cur-
rents, obstructions to wind flow, including mountain waves, and
windshear (or any combination of these conditions) .12 In addi-
tion, wake turbulence is also a significant cause of turbulence,
however, it is an aircraft operational phenomenon rather than a
pure meteorological event. Wake turbulence accidents usually
occur when large aircraft generate wing tip vortices during take-
off or landing, causing a smaller plane traveling too close to the
large plane to become uncontrollable and crash. 3 The stan-
dard air traffic controller warning, "caution wake turbulence," is
intended to alert trailing planes to keep their distance from
larger planes in front of them in order to allow the wake turbu-
lence to dissipate. 4
A. CONVECTIVE CURRENTS
Convective currents, a common cause of turbulence at low al-
titudes, are both ascending and descending vertical air move-
ments. Like Sir Isaac Newton's law, "[t]o every action there is
11 The Code of Federal Regulations now mandates the following: "After each
takeoff, immediately before or immediately after turning the seat belt sign off, an
announcement shall be made that passengers should keep their seat belts fast-
ened, while seated, even when the seat belt sign is off." 14 C.F.R. § 121.571 (a) (2)
(1999).
Another regulation requires: "[T]he 'Fasten Seat Belt' sign shall be turned on
during any movement on the surface, for each takeoff, for each landing, and at
any other time considered necessary by the pilot in command." 14 C.F.R.
§ 121.317(b) (1999).
12 See FAA FLIGHT STANDARDS SERVICE AND NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE, ADvi-
SORY CIRCULAR No. 00-6A, AVIATION WEATHER 80 (Rev. 1975) [hereinafter FSS
AVIATION WEATHER]; IRVIN N. GLEIM, AVIATION WEATHER AND WEATHER SERVICES
93 (1995).
15 See FSS AVIATION WEATHER, supra note 12, at 88.
14 FAA, ORDER 7110.65, AIR TRAmc CONTROL §§ 2-1-19, 3-9-7 (1999) [herein-
after AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL].
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always opposed an equal reaction,"' 5 for each ascending current
there is a corresponding downward current.1
6
Land and water surfaces heat the adjoining air differently.
For example, during the day, barren land radiates heat readily
while water and vegetation do so more slowly. The resulting
lack of uniform heating causes convective currents.' 7 On warm
summer afternoons when winds are light, convective currents
are quite active. As cold air moves over a warm surface, the air
becomes unstable at lower levels. Convective currents often ex-
tend several thousand feet above the surface causing rough,
choppy air. i" This is the reason, as most passengers are aware,
that flying above the cloud level produces a smoother ride than
flying immediately below it.
Convective currents can also create difficulty in landings be-
cause they affect the rate of descent.' 9 On approach to an air-
port, turbulence can cause abrupt changes in airspeed and may
require an increase or decrease in airspeed beyond normal ap-
proach speed. While this procedure seems to conflict with the
general rule of reducing airspeed for penetrating turbulence,
the approach speed is generally below that recommended for
turbulence penetration.2 °
When convection exists in higher altitudes, it produces large
cumulus and cumulonimbus clouds with anvil-like heads.2'
These cumulonimbus provide a visual warning of potentially vio-
15 JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 282 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed.
1992).
16 See FSS AVIATION WEATHER, supra note 12, at 80-81. Naturally, for each as-
cending current, the descending current is not necessarily the same level of in-
tensity or geographic size, and it may be located a distance away. See id. at 81.
17 FAA AND U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. 61-23B, PILOT'S
HANDBOOK OF AERONAUTICAL KNOWLEDGE 109 (Rev. 1980) [hereinafter PILOT'S
HANDBOOK].
18 See FSS AVIATION WEATHER, supra note 12, at 81.
19 See PILOT'S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 109.
20 See FSS AVIATION WEATHER, supra note 12, at 81.
21 There are generally two types of clouds, cumulus and stratus. Localized in-
tense vertical currents lifting moist air to its condensation point create cumulus
clouds. Broad horizontal currents create stratus clouds, which means "spread
out." Clouds near the surface of the earth are usually called either cumulus or
stratus, unless they are causing precipitation, in which case the term "nimbus,"
which means rain cloud, is added. Clouds at intermediate heights (5,000-20,000
feet) are referred to as altostratus or altocumulus, with the added prefix "alto"
meaning high. Meteorologists refer to the "alto" cloud group as middle level
clouds. Clouds that form in the higher levels of the troposphere (20,000-50,000
feet) include the prefix "cirro," which means curly, because clouds at that level
have a curly appearance. See PILOT'S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 119.
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lent convective turbulence. 22 Convective currents can still be ac-
tive, however, even in the absence of cumulus clouds if the air is
too dry for cumulus clouds to form.23 This has been referred to
as clear air turbulence (CAT), discussed in more detail in
section D.
B. OBSTRUCTIONS TO AIRFLOW
Both man-made and natural obstructions interrupt otherwise
smooth wind flow creating mechanical turbulence. As wind
blows around an object or obstruction it forms eddies or gusts
with fluctuations in air speed and direction.24 Mechanical tur-
bulence fluctuates according to wind speed and the nature of
the obstruction. The greater the speed or rougher the surface,
the greater the turbulence. The physical appearance of the
clouds identifies whether the turbulence is caused by convective
or mechanical mixing. Rows or bands of stratocumulus clouds
indicate mechanical mixing, while a random pattern is consis-
tent with convective clouds.25
Airports are particularly susceptible to mechanical turbu-
lence, which naturally produces gusty surface winds. When fly-
ing in a low level approach, or climbing, airspeed changes can
be so rapid and drastic that an aircraft can even stall. There-
fore, when gusty conditions prevail, the pilot must anticipate the
need for changes in airspeed by maintaining a margin of air-
speed above normal approach. 26 The Pilot's Handbook of Aero-
nautical Knowledge recommends that landings and take-offs in
gusty conditions should be made at higher speeds in order to
maintain sufficient control.27
A quite different situation is caused when calm air crosses a
mountain barrier because wind flows across the barrier in layers
causing "mountain waves."' 28 These mountain waves can extend
100 miles or more downwind from the barrier. The waves re-
main relatively stationary while the wind blows through them,
22 Cumulonimbus clouds, which are extremely dangerous, sometimes take the
form of a continuous or virtually continuous line, caused by a front or squall line.
They can be extremely turbulent, in part, because they are formed by rising air
currents. See PILOT'S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 123.
23 See FSS AVIATION WEATHER, supra note 12, at 81.
24 See PILOT'S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 109-13.
25 See FSS AVIATION WEATHER, supra note 12, at 82-83.
26 See id. at 83.
27 See PILOT'S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 113.
28 See FSS AvWATION WEATHER supra note 12, at 83-84.
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and as such, are sometimes also called "standing" waves. Under
each wave crest is a circular rotation, called a rotor, which can
produce violent turbulence.29 Mountain wave turbulence is
prevalent when winds of forty knots or more blow across a
mountain or ridge. Reports of turbulence due to mountain
waves run the gamut from extremely minor to severe enough to
damage aircraft and injure passengers. Consequently, any de-
gree of turbulence caused by a mountain range is possible and
should be anticipated.3
British Airways Board v. The Boeing Co.31 provides an example of
severe damage caused by mountain wave turbulence. A British
Airways aircraft disintegrated mid-air when it encountered se-
vere CAT in the form of a mountain wave near Mt. Fuji, Japan
on March 5, 1966.32 British Airways claimed the accident was
due to a manufacturing defect, while Boeing claimed that the
"pilot flew close to Mt. Fuji at too low an altitude," causing it to
encounter CAT so extreme that it exceeded the design capabili-
ties of the aircraft.3 Boeing's motion for summary judgment
was granted because British Airways produced no evidence to
controvert Boeing's theory. 4
The FAA provides pilots with the following information and
recommended precautions associated with flying over moun-
tainous terrain:
1. pay attention to visible cues;
2. turbulence can be expected when wind at mountain top level
exceeds twenty-five knots; extreme caution should be exer-
cised when the component of the wind perpendicular to the
mountain range exceeds forty knots;
3. convective clouds on the windward side of a mountain indi-
cate unstable air and are consistent with turbulence on close
proximity to either side of the mountain;
4. standing lenticular and rotor clouds indicate a mountain
wave and turbulence can be expected many miles to the lee-
ward side of the mountain;
5. when flying towards mountains from the leeward side, begin
the climb a great distance from the mountains-100 miles in
a mountain wave and thirty to fifty miles otherwise;
29 See id. at 83-85.
30 See id. at 85.
31 585 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1978).
32 See id. at 949.
33 Id. at 950.
34 See id. at 951.
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6. avoid flying through mountain passes and valleys in high
winds.35
C. WINDSHEAR
Much has been written about windshear. Though it can be
deadly, many pilots do not fully appreciate the risks associated
with windshear. It has been a substantial factor in several tragic
and avoidable crashes and numerous deaths and injuries. Re-
markably, during the period 1964 through 1986, at least thirty-
two accidents and incidents involving windshear have been doc-
umented, resulting in over 600 fatalities and nearly 250 inju-
ries.3 6 These statistics prompted the FAA to publish the Pilot
Windshear Guide. 7
Among the many disasters involving windshear that have oc-
curred in the last few years, some of the most notable include
the Delta Flight 191 crash at Dallas-Fort Worth on August 2,
1985, the Northwest 255 crash at the Detroit Metropolitan Air-
port on August 16, 1987, and the USAir Flight 1016 at Charlotte
International Airport on July 2, 1992.8
Windshear is an abrupt change "in wind speed and/or direc-
tion over a short distance." 9 It can be horizontal or vertical,
and it "generates eddies between two wind currents of differing
velocities. ''4 The differences may be in wind direction, speed,
or both.4 '
There are several causes of low level windshear, including
temperature inversions, frontal zones, and thunderstorms.42
35 See FSS AVIATION WEATHER, supra note 12, at 85-86.
36 See FAA AND U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. 00-54, PILOT
WINDSHEAR GUIDE, App. 1, § 2.0 (Nov. 25, 1988) [hereinafter PILOT WINDSHEAR
GUIDE].
37 Id.
38 Many other crashes have been attributed to windshear, including the August
1975 crash of Continental Flight 426 in Denver, the July 1982 crash of Pan Am
Flight 759 in New Orleans, and the June 1975 crash of Eastern Airlines Flight 66
in New York (JFK).
39 Major John E. Richardson, Wind Shear, FLYING SA'ETY, Aug. 1981, at 5.
40 FSS AVIATION WEATHER, supra note 12, at 86.
41 The FAA has defined windshear as "[a]ny rapid change in wind direction or
velocity, and 'severe windshear' as [a] rapid change in wind direction or veloc-
ity," causing airspeed changes greater than 15 knots or vertical speed changes
greater than 500 feet per minute." PILOT WINDSHEAR GUIDE, supra note 36, App.
1 § 2.2.
42 See FSS AVIATION WEATHER, supra note 12, at 86-87.
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High level CAT is associated with a jet stream or strong
circulation.43
1. Windshear with a low-level temperature inversion
On a clear night with light surface winds, temperature inver-
sions form near the earth's surface, and wind immediately above
the inversion can be rather strong. As an aircraft climbs or de-
scends through the inversion, windshear can be encountered
close to the ground. The shear plane and gusty winds move
closer to the ground as the inversions dissipate.44
2. Windshear in a frontal zone
Wind fluctuates abruptly in frontal zones, but not all fronts
necessarily have associated windshear. Usually, shear creates a
problem in fronts having steep wind gradients.45 Given that
windshear is most dangerous when it occurs close to the ground,
it is important to be able to calculate the approximate height of
the front above an airport.46 When the temperature across the
front at the surface is ten degrees Fahrenheit, and the front is
moving at thirty knots or more, there is a high likelihood that
windshear is present on approach.47
3. Windshear associated with a thunderstorm
A violent and potentially devastating aspect of a thunderstorm
is the associated windshear. The winds surrounding a thunder-
storm are "complex" and windshear can occur on all sides of a
cell.4" A rapid change and increase in wind at low levels imme-
diately before the arrival of a thunderstorm produces what is
known as the "first gust" or the "gust front." These gusty winds
are caused by large downdrafts hitting the ground and spread-
43 See id. at 86-88. See also infra section D.
44 See Richardson, supra note 39, at 7. In the Southwest, in fact, a ninety degree
change in direction and a twenty or thirty degree increase in surface winds within
the space of a few minutes is not unusual. See id.
45 See id. at 5-6.
46 SeePILoT's HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 116. When a cold front is moving at
thirty or more knots, the frontal or windshear zone will usually be five thousand
feet above the airport approximately three hours after the frontal passage. When
a warm front is moving through an area close to an airport, windshear may exist
from the surface to five thousand feet, above ground level (AGL) approximately
six hours before the front passes the airport. See id.
47 See Richardson, supra note 39, at 6.
48 See PILOT'S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 114.
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ing horizontally.49 Approach under these conditions can be
treacherous given the possibility of shear.
Much closer in proximity to the thunderstorm than the "first
gust" is a microburst that is an extremely powerful localized
downdraft from a thunderstorm." In some cases, the strength
of a microburst can exceed that of an aircraft. 51 As early as
1988, the FAA emphasized that "IT IS VITAL TO RECOGNIZE
THAT SOME MICROBURSTS CANNOT BE SUCCESSFULLY
ESCAPED WITH ANY KNOWN TECHNIQUES! '52 The dangers
associated with windshear cannot be overstated. Otherwise ordi-
nary approaches can become dire emergencies in seconds.53
49 These gusty winds have been known to alter direction by as much as 180
degrees and achieve speeds of 100 knots ten miles ahead of a storm. Wind speed
may increase by as much as fifty percent between the surface and 1,500 feet,
presenting a potentially dangerous shear condition for a flight on approach. See
Richardson, supra note 39, at 6.
50 Microbursts are not only associated with thunderstorms. They also occur
with lighter precipitation corresponding to convective clouds and relatively dry
conditions of light rain or virga (precipitation which evaporates before reaching
the earth's surface). See PILOT WINDSHFAR GUIDE, supra note 36, App. 1 § 2.2.
51 A downdraft can exceed 720 feet vertical velocity at 300 feet above ground
level. See id.
52 Id. App. 1 § 2.2.
53 The FAA has provided the following Microburst Windshear Guidelines:
TABLE I
MICROBURST WINDSHEAR PROBABILITY GUIDELINES
PROBABILITY
OBSERVATION OF WINDSHEAR
PRESENCE OF CONVECTIVE WEATHER
NEAR INTENDED FLIGHT PATH:
With localized strong winds (Tower reports
or observed blowing dust, rings of dust,
tornado-like features, etc.)
With heavy precipitation (Observed or





With moderate or greater turbulence
(reported or radar indications)
With temperature/dew point spread
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PIREP OF AIRSPEED LOSS OR GAIN:
15 knots or greater HIGH
Less than 15 knots MEDIUM
LLWAS ALERT/WIND VELOCITY
CHANGE:
20 knots or greater HIGH
Less than 20 knots MEDIUM
FORECAST OF CONVECTIVE WEATHER LOW
Id. App. 1 § 2.4.2. tbl. 1.
NOTE: These guidelines apply to operations in the airport vicinity
(within 3 miles of the point of takeoff or landing along the intended
flight path and below 1000 feet AGL). The clues should be considered
cumulative. If more than one is observed, the probability weighting
should be increased. The hazard increases with proximity to the con-
vective weather. Weather assessment should be made continuously.
CAUTION: CURRENTLY NO QUANTITATIVE MEANS EXISTS FOR
DETERMINING THE PRESENCE OR INTENSITY OF MICROBURST
WINDSHEAR. PILOTS ARE URGED TO EXERCISE CAUTION IN
DETERMINING A COURSE OF ACTION.
Table 1, designed specifically for convection weather (thunderstorm,
rainshower, virga), provides a subjective evaluation of various observa-
tional clues to aid in making appropriate real time avoidance decisions.
The observation weighting is categorized according to the following
scale:
HIGH PROBABILITY:
Critical attention need [sic] to be given to this observation. A decision
to avoid (e.g., divert or delay) is appropriate.
MEDIUM PROBABILITY:
Consideration should be given to aoviding. Precautions are
appropriate.
LOW PROBABILITY:
Consideration should be given to this observation, but a decision to
avoid is not generally indicated.
Although encountering weather conditions described in Table 1 above
1000 feet may be less critical in terms of flight path, such encounters
may present other significant weather related risks. Pilots are therefore
urged to exercise caution when determining a course of action. Use of
Table 1 should not replace sound judgement in making avoidance
decisions.
Windshear clues should be considered cumulative. The probability for
each single observation is given. However, if more than one windshear
clue is observed, the total probability rating may be increased to reflect
the total set of observations.
Example:
Nearing destination, VIRGA is seen descending from high based
clouds over the airfield (MEDIUM PROBABILITY). Commencing ap-
proach, a PIREP is received indicating that another flight just exper-
ienced a 10 knot airspeed loss on final approach to the same airport
(MEDIUM PROBABILITY). Therefore, it would be appropriate to
raise the total avoidance decision weighting to HIGH PROBABILITY
(indicating a decision to avoid is appropriate).
Id. § 2.4.2.
TURBULENCE CASE
Windshear can be vertical, horizontal, or both simultaneously.
Horizontal shear occurs when an aircraft flies through a wind-
shift plane. Vertical shear occurs near the ground when a
change in velocity or direction "drastically alter[s] lift, IAS [indi-
cated air speed], and thrust requirements and can exceed the
pilot's capability to recover."54 Vertical shear can also occur
aloft, especially near thunderstorm updrafts.
D. CLEAR AIR TURBULENCE
Clear air turbulence (CAT) implies turbulence without
clouds. The term also is used to convey high level windshear
turbulence. CAT is different from storm related turbulence be-
cause it cannot be seen and lacks precipitation or other visual
cues to warn of its presence. CAT can toss a huge jet, like it did
to United Airlines Flight 826 cruising between Tokyo and Hono-
lulu on December 28, 1997. 55
The jet stream is a narrow meandering river of winds moving
around the globe with wave-like motion. 6 To be considered a
jet stream, the concentrated winds must have a speed of at least
fifty knots.5 7 In the upper atmosphere, jet stream segments
move along pressure ridges and troughs. 8
A turbulent energy exchange, near the jet stream and along
the boundary between cold and warm air masses, creates CAT.
Since the greatest differentiation between warm and cold
weather exists in the winter, CAT is most prevalent during that
season.
59
CAT occurs most often in an upper trough on the polar or
cold side of the jet stream.6' That is to say, "it is most common
near upper air fronts and the tropopause, the thin layer of air
that marks the boundary between troposphere and stratosphere
and generally has a temperature of -55°C to -65°C."61 CAT also
54 Richardson, supra note 39, at 7.
55 See Hosenball, supra note 7, at 34. The Boeing 747 aircraft lurched up for
six seconds, then dropped several hundred feet, killing one passenger and injur-
ing approximately one hundred others. See id.
- See GLEIM, supra note 12, ch. 13, at 145.
57 See id.
58 See id. at 146.
59 See id. at 148.
- See id.
61 James T. McKenna, Rallyingfor Attack on Turbulence, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., July 27, 1998, at 41.
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frequently occurs along the jet stream north and northeast of a
quickly deepening surface low. 62
E. MEASURING AND DETECTING TURBULENCE
The Federal Aviation Administration has provided the follow-
ing guidelines to define the relative degree of turbulence:
" Light Intensity: "turbulence that momentarily causes slight,
erratic changes in altitude and/or attitude. Occupants may
feel a slight strain against seat belts or shoulder straps. Un-
secured objects may be displaced slightly."6 3
* Moderate Intensity: "turbulence that is similar to light turbu-
lence but of greater intensity. Changes in altitude and/or at-
titude occur but the aircraft remains in positive control.
Occupants feel definite strains against seat belts or shoulder
straps. Unsecured objects are dislodged. Walking and food
service are difficult."
64
" Severe Intensity: "turbulence causing large, abrupt changes in
altitude and/or attitude, usually causing large variations in in-
dicated airspeed. Aircraft may be momentarily out of control.
Occupants are forced violently against seat belts or shoulder
straps. Unsecured objects are tossed about. Food service and
walking are impossible."
65
* Extreme Intensity: "turbulence in which the aircraft is vio-
lently tossed about and is practically impossible to control. It
may cause structural damage."66
1. Clear Air Turbulence Detection
Conventional thinking has been that "pilots have no defense
against turbulence-especially the most treacherous type: clear
air turbulence .... Today scores of researchers and safety advo-
cates are challenging that conventional thinking. With advances
in computing power and new schemes for deciphering its mys-
teries, they are pursuing ways to make turbulence obvious to air-
line crews. '' 67 These analytical tools are of critical importance to
aviation litigants because their use will enable litigants to know
whether an air turbulence injury or death claim has merit.
While methods for detecting CAT have advanced, pilot training
62 See GLEiM, supra note 12, at 148.
63 FAA AND U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsp., AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL 7-1-




67 McKenna, supra note 61, at 40.
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and experience remain the principle tools available to predict
CAT.
One of the most significant tools being developed to detect
CAT is a Doppler laser radar device called a lidar. The lidar
beams forward from the aircraft's nose to sense the movement
of dust and natural aerosol particles in turbulent air several
miles ahead of the aircraft. When the beam strikes particles in
the air, it bounces back to the aircraft, showing different air pat-
terns. Above 22,000 feet, however, where most large aircraft
cruise, there are few particles, moisture, or other pollutants that
the lidar can beam back to the aircraft.
The National Center for Atmospheric Research and NASA/
Dryden began a series of tests in March and April of 1998, using
the lidar built by Coherent Technologies, Incorporated. These
experiments may lead to the development of a "real-time lidar
turbulence detector for commercial aircraft."6 The lidar on a
NASA aircraft is capable of detecting turbulence a few seconds
before impact, but, this may not be sufficient time to avert the
potential disaster.
Some other notable gains in CAT detection are the gathering
of "truth data" to improve the forecasting of turbulence, and the
increasing budget dedicated to the aviation weather research
program.69 The WSR-88 Doppler weather radars, dubbed
NEXRAD, may also be used to predict turbulence. The
NEXRAD provides coverage of more than 90% of the U.S. skies
at altitudes above 10,000 feet.7 0
Northwest Airlines is credited with having the fewest turbu-
lence encounters among the U.S. carriers, in large measure be-
cause of their in-house meteorological department that
produces turbulence plots. 71 Their meteorological department
prepares turbulence plots for six U.S. geographical regions, the
transatlantic region, and India. In addition, Northwest has a
team of meteorologists in Tokyo issuing turbulence plots for
Asia. These plots rank the anticipated turbulence on a zero-to-
6 Paul Proctor, Turbulence Radar Trials, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 6,
1998, at 13.
69 See McKenna, supra note 61, at 40. "Truth data" is the collection during
routine airline flights of a wealth of data concerning the dimensions of the fields
of turbulence in real time. In 1997, the FAA had a budget of $3 million dollars.
Last year, the agency requested $12 million. See id.
70 See id. at 42.
71 See James Ott, Safety, Legal Concerns Shape Airline Policies, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., July 27, 1998, at 42.
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seven scale, with seven meaning extreme turbulence, identify
wind speed and direction, and indicate where the turbulence is
expected. Each area of turbulence is tagged either red or am-
ber, red indicating to avoid the turbulence and amber indicat-
ing to watch the weather. It is important to note that Northwest
meteorologists find frequent correspondence between altocu-
mulus standing lenticular clouds and clear air turbulence.72
2. Low Level Windshear Detection
Because windshear is frequently associated with thunder-
storms, the best means to "detect" it is actually to avoid flying
near the thunderstorm system altogether. To do so, pilots
should rely on Pilot Reports (Pireps), the information available
on the in-flight radar as well as the obvious cues of thunder-
storms visible to the cockpit crew out of the window.73
The FAA has long warned that the "best way a pilot can cope
with windshear is to: (a) Know it is there. (b) Know the magni-
72 See James Ott, Turbulence Plot Gives Crews Ample Warning, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., July 27, 1998, at 68.
73 The FAA has spelled out a list of instructive "do's and don'ts" concerning
thunderstorm flying:
(1) Don't land or takeoff in the face of an approaching thunder-
storm. A sudden gust front of low level turbulence could cause
loss of control.
(2) Don't attempt to fly under a thunderstorm even if you can see
through to the other side. Turbulence and windshear under
the storm could be disastrous.
(3) Don't fly without airborne radar into a cloud mass containing
scattered embedded thunderstorms. Scattered thunderstorms
not embedded usually can be visually circumnavigated.
(4) Don't trust the visual appearance to be a reliable indicator of
the turbulence inside a thunderstorm.
(5) Do avoid by at least 20 miles any thunderstorm identified as
severe or giving an intense radar echo. This is especially true
under the anvil of a large cumulonimbus.
(6) Do clear the top of a known or suspected severe thunderstorm
by at least 1,000 feet altitude for each 10 knots of wind speed at
the cloud top. This should exceed the altitude capability of
most aircraft.
(7) Do circumnavigate the entire area if the area has 6/10 thun-
derstorm coverage.
(8) Do remember that vivid and frequent lightning indicates the
probability of a strong thunderstorm.
(9) Do regard as extremely hazardous any thunderstorm with tops
35,000 feet or higher whether the top is visually sighted or de-
termined by radar.
AERONAUTICAL INFO. MANUAL, supra note 63, 7-1-26.
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tude of the change. (c) Be prepared to correct or go around."74
In fact, the Pilot Windshear Guide, by the FAA, stresses:
The primary lesson learned is that the best defense against wind-
shear is to avoid it altogether. This is especially important be-
cause shears will exist which are beyond the capability of any
pilot or airplane. In most windshear accidents, several clues-
LLWAS [Low Level Windshear Alert System] alerts, weather re-
ports, visual signs-were present that would have alerted the
flight crew to the presence of a windshear threat. In all in-
stances, however, these clues were either not recognized or not
acted upon.
75
Therefore, one of the most critical means of avoidance is to
thoroughly evaluate the weather.76
The National Weather Service provides a wealth of weather
information in conjunction with the FAA. "Aerodrome forecasts
are prepared by approximately 100 Weather Forecast Offices
(WFOs). These offices prepare and distribute approximately
525 aerodrome forecasts [4] times daily for specific airports in
the 50 States, Puerto Rico, the Caribbean and Pacific Islands.
74 Major John E. Richardson, Wind Shear Part II, FLYING SAFETY, Sept. 1981, at
18 [hereinafter Richardson II].
75 Pilot Windshear Guide, supra note 36 § 2.3. The FAA's Pilot Windshear Guide
enumerates the many lessons learned from evaluating numerous windshear en-
counters during takeoff after liftoff, during takeoff on the runway, and during
approach. See id. §§ 2.3.1-2.3.3.
76 The complete "Air Traffic Control Package" can be requested at the re-
gional office of the FAA Office in which the accident occurred. To obtain the
regional office address, write to the National Headquarters of the Federal Avia-
tion Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC 20591.
The complete weather package including the weather for the entire route of the
aircraft can be obtained by writing to:
1) Director










Silver Springs, MD 20910
This package should include all forecasts, surface weather observation,
NOTAMS, PIREPS, SIGMETS, radar weather photographs and winds aloft.
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These forecasts are valid for 24 hours and amended as
required. 77
The FAA also maintains a nationwide network of automated
Flight Service Stations to address the weather needs of pilots.
There are several weather observation programs that provide
important data in manual and automated fashion.
Manual remarks consist of reports from airport locations
staffed by FAA or National Weather Service employees who man-
ually observe, calculate, and enter their observations into the
communication system. Manual Input remarks will include sky
conditions, visibility, weather and obstructions to vision, temper-
ature, dewpoint, wind, and altimeter setting. 78
The Automated Weather Observation System provides
weather conditions at a specific airport with minute-by-minute
weather observations. These automated observations evaluate
ceiling and sky cover, clouds, visibility, surface wind conditions
at the specific terminal, and obstructions or impairments to vi-
sion. Automated remarks will include density altitude, variable
visibility, and variable wind direction. 79
These manual and automated remarks can provide indispen-
sable cues and warnings about potential turbulence encounters
at low altitudes or on landings.8 0 They will also provide addi-
tional clues for windshear, including references to thunder-
storms, rainshowers, or blowing dust.
Large differences between the temperature and dewpoint
spread will warn pilots of low humidity. Dew point is very signifi-
cant to pilots because it represents an important condition of
the air. Water vapor condenses and becomes visible as tempera-
ture reaches the dewpoint. The water vapor then becomes dew
or frost on the landing surface and becomes fog, clouds, rain, or
snow in the air.81
77 AERONAUTICAL INFO. MANUAL, supra note 63, 7-1-1 (b).
78 See id. at 7-1-10.
79 See id.
80 The FAA provides a pamphlet, entitled "NOTAM AND WEATHER CON-
TRACTIONS TRANSLATOR," which defines the commonly used contractions
for area forecasts, SIGMETS and other weather information. The pamphlet can
be requested by writing to:
Federal Aviation Administration
Air Traffic Publications Branch, ATX-420
Room 428
800 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20951
81 PILOT's HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 118.
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3. Weather Advisories, Radar, and Other Means of Detecting
Turbulent Conditions
The National Weather Service issues a variety of weather ad-
visories that serve to alert pilots of the possibility of encounter-
ing hazardous weather conditions. These advisories include
Severe Weather Forecast Alerts (AWWs), Significant Meteoro-
logical Information or SIGMETs (WSs), Convective SIGMETs
(WSTs), Center Weather Advisories (CWAs), and Airmen's Me-
terological Information or AIRMETS (WAs).82 To evaluate the
risk of windshear, each of the above alerts should be fully ex-
plored, as well as the Low Level Windshear Alert System
(LLWAS), visual observations from the cockpit, Pilot Reports
(PIREPs), and Airborne Weather Radar.
a. Severe Weather Forecast Alerts (AWWs)
Pilots should always pay attention to aviation severe weather
forecasts. Severe weather forecasts are unscheduled messages
identifying areas of possible severe thunderstorms or tornados.
Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC) broadcast the fore-
casts on all frequencies, except the emergency frequency, when
any of the weather conditions alerted to is within 150 miles of
the airspace under their jurisdiction.
b. SIGMETs (WSs)
SIGMETs are unscheduled in-flight advisory forecasts that
warn of the development of hazardous weather conditions.
SIGMETs are critical to all types of aircraft and specify the pe-
riod for which the advisory is valid.
A SIGMET will be issued by the Aviation Weather Center
when any of the following exist: "(1) Es] evere or extreme turbu-
lence, or clear air turbulence (CAT) not associated with thun-
derstorms; (2) [s] evere icing not associated with thunderstorms;
(3) [d]uststorms, sandstorms, or volcanic ash lowering surface
or inflight visibilities to below three miles; or (4) [v]olcanic
eruption. ' 3
c. Convective SIGMETs
Three convective SIGMET bulletins covering the Eastern,
Central, and Western United States are issued. Each convective
82 See AERONAUTICAL INFo. MANUAL, supra note 63, 7-1-5(a).
83 Id. 7-1-5(e).
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SIGMET bulletin will (1) be comprised of one or more
SIGMETs, (2) be valid for two hours (unless it is superseded),
and (3) contain a forecast or an observation and a forecast.84
Convective SIGMETs are issued for forecasts of any of the fol-
lowing weather conditions (1) severe thunderstorms expected
to produce, surface winds greater than or equal to 50 knots, hail
of 3/4 inches or greater in diameter, or tornadoes; (2) embed-
ded thunderstorms; (3) a line of thunderstorms; or (4) thunder-
storms greater than or equal to VIP level 4 intensity affecting
40% or more of an area at least 3,000 square miles.85
d. AIRMETs (WAs)
Airmen's Meteorological Information may be important to
any pilot, and are issued every six hours for all domestic air
space. They are based on forecasts of moderate icing or turbu-
lence, sustained winds greater then thirty knots or within
1,000 feet of the surface, and extensive areas of visibility below
three miles. They are of special significance to pilots without
instrument ratings.86
e. Center Weather Advisories (CWAs)
Center Weather Advisories are unscheduled in-flight, flow
control, and air crew advisories. They have a short lead time
and are issued to supplement a SIGMET, Convective SIGMET,
or AIRMET that has already been issued. They will also be is-
sued when either (1) an in-flight advisory has not been issued,
but based on current pilot reports, weather conditions meet
SIGMET or AIRMET requirements; or (2) when weather condi-
tions do not meet SIGMET or AIRMET requirements, but pilot
reports or other sources of weather information indicate that
present or anticipated meteorological conditions will adversely
affect the safe flow of traffic. 87
f. The Federal Aviation Administration's Windshear
Detection Plan
The FAA now uses an integrated plan for windshear detection
to improve the safety and capability of most airports. The plan
integrates the Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR), the
Weather System Processor (WSP), and the Low Level Windshear
84 See id. 7-1-5(d) (2).
85 See id. 7-1-5(c)(1)-(4).
86 See id. 7-1-5(h).
87 See id. 7-1-5(g).
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weather conditions, turbulence of moderate degree or greater,
and windshear.91
i. Turbulence PIREPs
Pilots are encouraged to report turbulent conditions to Air
Traffic Control as soon as is practicable, and should indicate the
following "(1) [a]ircraft location, (2) [t]ime of occurrence in
UTC, (3) [tlurbulence intensity, (4) [w]hether the turbulence
occurred in or near clouds, (5) [a]ircraft altitude or flight level,
(6) [t]ype of aircraft, [and] (7) [d]uration of turbulence" (this
may be based on time between two locations or over one loca-
tion) .92 The classification of intensity should correspond to that
previously enumerated earlier in Section II E.93 The pilot
should also report the duration in the following terms: occa-
sional - less than 1/3 of the time; intermittent - 1/3 to 2/3; con-
tinuous-more than 2/3.o4
ii. Clear Air Turbulence PIREPs
The Aeronautical Information Manual emphasizes that "CAT
has become a very serious operational factor to flight operations
at all levels and especially to jet traffic flying in excess of 15,000
feet."95 Consequently, all pilots experiencing CAT conditions
are urged to report the time, locations, and intensity (light,
moderate, severe or extreme) as quickly as practicable.96
iii. Windshear PIREPs
As unexpected changes in direction and wind speed can
wreak havoc on departing and arriving aircraft at low altitudes,
pilots are urged to make prompt reports of any windshear con-
ditions they experience. The accepted reporting method is to
identify the specific gain or loss in airspeed and the respective
altitudes at which the plane experienced the change in
airspeed.97
91 See AERONAUTICAL INFO. MANUAL, supra note 63, 7-1-18(a).
92 Id. 7-1-20(a).
93 See id., tbl. 7-1-26.
94 See id.
95 Id. 7-1-22.
96 See AERONAUTICAL INFO. MANUAL, supra note 63, 7-1-22.
97 See id. at 7-1-21(b).
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Not all airports in the United States have an LLWAS. In fact,
LLWAS was incorporated in only 110 airports in the United
States in 1988. Many of these systems have been replaced by
advanced technology including TDWR and WSP. While all
LLWAS systems will eventually be phased out, thirty-nine air-
ports will be upgraded to the LLWAS-NE (Network Expansion),
the latest software and sensor technology. 9 This system contin-
ues to provide controllers with windshear warnings and alerts,
and provides the location of the hazard in relation to the run-
way. The system can accommodate as many as thirty-two sensors
located at an airport.
Currently windshear and microburst information and warn-
ings are shown on ribbon display terminals in the tower cabs.
Because data is standardized in the LLWAS, TDWR, and WSP
systems, the controller does not interpret the data, but rather
simply reads the displayed information directly to the pilot.
g. Visual Observations From the Cockpit
Because microbursts often occur in convective weather condi-
tions, such as those presenting cumulus clouds, thunderstorms,
rain showers, and virga, microburst windshear can be indicated
by some of these obvious visual clues. Microburst windshear
may also be indicated by rain "accompanied by curling outflow,
a ring of blowing dust or localized dust in general, flying debris,
virga, a rain core with rain diverging away horizontally from the
rain core or tornadic features (funnel clouds, tornados)."90
h. Pilot Reports (PIREPs)
PIREPs are the direct perceptions of the pilots who have ob-
served cloud types and turbulence during actual flights. PIREPs
issued from the cockpits of commercial aircraft concerning ab-
rupt airspeed changes on approach can indicate the presence of
windshear. Their reports of current weather conditions of tur-
bulence are also critical to aid meteorologists in creating
forecasts.
FAA air traffic facilities must ask for PIREPs when the follow-
ing weather is reported or forecast: ceilings at or below 5,000
feet, visibility at or below 5 miles, thunderstorms and related
89 See id. at 7-1-31.
90 See PILOT WINDSHEAR GUIDE, supra note 36, App. 1, at 329.
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weather conditions, turbulence of moderate degree or greater,
and windshear. 91
i. Turbulence PIREPs
Pilots are encouraged to report turbulent conditions to Air
Traffic Control as soon as is practicable, and should indicate the
following "(1) [a]ircraft location, (2) [t]ime of occurrence in
UTC, (3) [t]urbulence intensity, (4) [w]hether the turbulence
occurred in or near clouds, (5) [a] ircraft altitude or flight level,
(6) [t]ype of aircraft, [and] (7) [d]uration of turbulence" (this
may be based on time between two locations or over one loca-
tion) .12 The classification of intensity should correspond to that
previously enumerated earlier in Section II E.9  The pilot
should also report the duration in the following terms: occa-
sional - less than 1/3 of the time; intermittent - 1/3 to 2/3; con-
tinuous-more than 2/3.94
ii. Clear Air Turbulence PIREPs
The Aeronautical Information Manual emphasizes that "CAT
has become a very serious operational factor to flight operations
at all levels and especially to jet traffic flying in excess of 15,000
feet."95 Consequently, all pilots experiencing CAT conditions
are urged to report the time, locations, and intensity (light,
moderate, severe or extreme) as quickly as practicable.96
iii. Windshear PItEPs
As unexpected changes in direction and wind speed can
wreak havoc on departing and arriving aircraft at low altitudes,
pilots are urged to make prompt reports of any windshear con-
ditions they experience. The accepted reporting method is to
identify the specific gain or loss in airspeed and the respective
altitudes at which the plane experienced the change in
airspeed. 97
91 See AERONAUTICAL INFO. MANUAL, supra note 63, 1 7-1-18(a).
92 Id. 1 7-1-20(a).
93 See id., tbl. 7-1-26.
94 See id.
95 Id. 7-1-22.
96 See AERONAUTICAL INFO. MANUAL, supra note 63, 7-1-22.
97 See id. at 7-1-21(b).
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i. Weather Radar Services
The National Weather Service utilizes a "network of radar
sites for detecting coverage, intensity, and movement of precipi-
tation. 98 Scheduled observations are made on an hourly basis
for flight planning purposes.9 9 The National Center for Envi-
ronmental Prediction collects the information disseminated in
the reports and uses it to prepare national summary radar
charts. 10 It is important to know, however, that clouds and fog
are not detected by the radar and that a clear radar display does
not necessarily mean that there is no significant weather or tur-
bulence in the area covered by the radar site.1"1
Access to weather radar displays is available in several loca-
tions. The center weather service units in ARTCCs have access
to the weather radar displays. Additionally, all en route flight
advisory service facilities have the capability to access the radar
displays from individual weather radar locations.10 2
j. Airborne Weather Radar
Airborne weather radar should be used routinely to evaluate
the presence of convective cells. Although incapable of de-
tecting windshear, airborne weather radar is a critical tool for
avoiding thunderstorms. Heavy precipitation pictured on the
radar associated with the visible clues of convective clouds indi-
cates the possibility of microbursts. In addition, some airborne
radars can detect some types of turbulence in precipitation.
III. THE SEATBELT RULE
The Federal Aviation Regulations specify that no one can op-
erate an airplane unless: "(a) [T] here are available during the
takeoff, enroute flight, and landing... (2) [a] n approved safety
belt for separate use by each person on board the airplane who
has reached his second birthday .... ",103 "In an effort to avoid
injuries caused by turbulence... American, United and Alaska
airlines ... require passengers to keep lap belts fastened when-
98 Id. at 7-1-11(a).
99 See id. 7-1-11 (b).
100 See id.
101 See id. 7-1-11(c).
102 See id. 7-1-11(d).
103 14 C.F.R. § 121.311(a)(2) (1999).
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ever they are seated. '10 4 Many other airlines have followed this
practice. This policy, prompted by serious turbulence-related
injuries, has been in place since late spring, 1988. Nonetheless,
the FAA has not made the requirements mandatory. Instead,
the Code of Federal Regulations now mandates that "[a]fter
each takeoff, immediately before or immediately after turning
the seat belt sign off, an announcement shall be made that pas-
sengers should keep their seat belts fastened, while seated, even
when the seat belt sign is off."10 Another regulation requires
that "[t]he 'Fasten Seat Belt' sign shall be turned on during any
movement on the surface, for each takeoff, for each landing,
and at any other time considered necessary by the pilot in
command."1 06
IV. THE APPLICABLE LAW
A. REs IPSA LOQUITUR
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur'0 7 has been addressed in nu-
merous turbulence cases. Res ipsa loquitur generally applies
when:
a. the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as does not
ordinarily happen if those in charge use due care;
b. the instrumentalities involved were under the exclusive man-
agement and control of the defendant;
c. and the defendant possesses superior knowledge or means of
information as to the cause of the occurrence. 08
In the absence of any questions of fact, the jury resolves these
questions. 109
The doctrine has been successfully applied in a few aviation
cases," 0 but has been generally unavailable in turbulence cases.
- Edward H. Phillips, Three U.S. Airlines Adopt Seat Belt Rule, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Apr. 6, 1998, at 60.
105 14 C.F.R. § 121.571(a) (2) (1999).
06 14 C.F.R. § 121.317(b) (1999).
107 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been rejected by many states as inap-
propriate for turbulence cases. See LEE S. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW
§ 2.09 (Mathew Bender, revised 1998).
108 Cudney v. Midcontinent Airlines, Inc., 254 S.W.2d 662, 665-66 (Mo. 1953);
see also Kohler v. Aspen Airways, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 720, 723 (1985).
-o See Cudney, 254 S.W.2d at 666.
110 See, e.g., Lobel v. American Airlines, 192 F.2d 217 (2d. Cir. 1951). In Lobel,
the aircraft engines stopped abruptly, and res ipsa loquitur was applied because
the defendant airline had exclusive control of the aircraft and the accident was
not one which ordinarily happens without someone's negligence. Id. at 219-20.
The doctrine was also successfully invoked in several cases in the 1950's. See Hass-
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As early as 1946, the doctrine was rejected as inappropriate in
turbulence cases.'1 ' In Cudney v. Midcontinent Airlines, Inc., Mrs.
Cudney was thrown from her seat and suffered personal injuries
when the aircraft encountered turbulence. Although the
seatbelt signal was lit, Mrs. Cudney was not wearing her
seatbelt. 112 In refusing to apply res ipsa loquitur, the court
stated:
The concern here is with the first element, whether the occur-
rence, the sudden and violent jerking, jolting drop of the plane,
causing the plaintiff to be thrown from her seat, was one which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence ....
... [I] t is urged that the defendants may have been negligent in
flying in the thundershower area and in the path of the down-
draft, if in fact the downdraft was the cause of the sudden and
unusual movement of the plane. But, there is no evidence that
flying conditions were abnormal or that there was any hazard at-
tached to flying in the wide thundershower area or that it was
possible to forecast danger of flying into downdrafts under the
prevailing conditions. There is no evidence that deviation from
course or any other action on the part of the pilots would have
either anticipated or avoided the downdraft, if that caused the
dropping movement of the plane. 'It appears now to be com-
mon knowledge with regard to the operation of airplanes that
downdrafts, which vary in effect according to their extent, are
not uncommon. It is true that such a manifestation of nature,
like the weather, is commonly referred to as an act of God .... In
short, it is not possible at this date, as it may be in another day, to
say that it is the common experience of mankind that commer-
cial airliners do not lurch and drop for some distance except for
negligence in the operation of the plane and, therefore, it is not
now possible to confidently apply the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur to the mere occurrence in the circumstances relied upon by
Mrs. Cudney, as it is in the instance of certain crashes,-there is
now no such balance of probabilities.' 13
In another turbulence case, the California Court of Appeals
rejected the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine be-
cause "an injury arising from an encounter with air turbulence
man v. Pacific Alaska Air Express, 100 F. Supp. 1 (D. Alaska 1951), affd sub nom.
Des Marais v. Beckman, 198 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1952) (unexplained disappear-
ance of an aircraft); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Rowe, 226 F.2d 365 (8th Cir.
1955) (unexplained crash of airplane into mountain).
III See Cudney, 254 S.W.2d at 667.
112 See id. at 663-64.
113 Id. at 666-67 (quoting Small v. Transcontinental & W. Air, 216 P.2d 36, 37
(Cal. Ct. App. 1950)).
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cannot be said to ordinarily occur only because defendant was
negligent."114
In a more recent case applying New York law, the court for
the Southern District of New York refused to apply res ipsa lo-
quitur where the plaintiff was injured due to clear air turbu-
lence. The court reasoned that because the doctrine does not
apply where there is unexpected CAT, the plaintiff had to estab-
lish that the pilot should have foreseen the turbulence and
taken steps to avert it.115
A host of other cases also reconfirm the commonly held posi-
tion that res ipsa loquitur will not apply in turbulence cases." 6
These cases universally reject the notion that turbulence can be
avoided and that the crew can take measures to avoid the turbu-
lence. It is critical, therefore, that the plaintiff focus on estab-
lishing the negligence of the crew and therefore avoid the need
to succeed on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
B. ESTABLISHING THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE AIRLINE
In Ness v. West Coast Airlines, the plaintiff was ejected from his
seat when the plane suddenly dipped while the fasten seat belt
sign was turned off.' At the close of plaintiffs evidence, the
trial court granted the defendant's motion for a directed ver-
dict. In remanding for a new trial, the appellate court re-
counted the evidence that tended to show meteorological
conditions consistent with air turbulence: cumulonimbus clouds
south of the departure city moving in the direction of the flight,
114 Kohler, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
"5 See Karuba v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 23 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,470 (S.D.N.Y.
1991). The court also determined that it was not necessary for the captain to
illuminate the seatbelt sign because the weather briefings prior to takeoff showed
no thunderstorm activity en route. Id. at 17,471-72.
116 See, e.g., Kelly v. American Airlines, Inc. 508 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1975)
(holding that where air turbulence was caused by either weather conditions or
wake turbulence, both of which could not be avoided, the doctrine of res ipsa is
inappropriate); Gafford v. Trans-Texas Airways, 299 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1962)
(holding that res ipsa loquitur is unavailing because the turbulence that caused
the aircraft to lurch was not claimed to be caused by the negligence of the crew
in operating the aircraft); Lazarus v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 292 F.2d 748, 750
(D.C. Cir. 1961) ("The dip of an airplane in flight which was only sharp enough
to upset a cup of tea is not an incident which probably would not have happened
unless the pilot had been negligent.") (emphasis added); Ness v. West Coast Air-
lines, 410 P.2d 965 (Idaho 1965); see also, Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Silber, 324
F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1963).
117 410 P.2d at 966.
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a low pressure area along the course of the flight, and the turbu-
lence located over rough mountainous terrain.' 1 8
In evaluating the meteorological evidence, the court stated:
The evidence would support a finding that the sudden downward
movement of the plane was caused by air turbulence, which de-
fendant should have anticipated, and that defendant's failure to
warn plaintiff of the probability of such motion, and the conse-
quent failure of plaintiff to use his seat belt, was sufficient to es-
tablish causal connection between defendant's failure to warn
plaintiff and the resultant injury.' 19
Proving negligence in turbulence cases is rarely that easy. In
Schultz v. American Airlines, 20 the plaintiff claimed that the tur-
bulence "was so extreme that he was thrown repeatedly against
his seat belt and the seat partition causing his spleen to bleed
and eventually rupture."12 1 The passenger who sat next to
Schultz testified that the flight was uneventful, and others
aboard the aircraft testified that there was some "bumpiness,"
but not to the degree described by Schultz. A maintenance log
indicated that, "[i] n flight during turbulence, yellow aft air stair
light illuminated.' 22 After the jury was deadlocked at five to
one following one and a half days of deliberation, the trial court
granted American's motion for a directed verdict. 23
In Kohler v. Aspen Airways, 24 the applicable weather forecast
predicted occasional moderate turbulence within 5,000 feet
throughout Nevada. When the plane entered the Tahoe region
at about 10,000 feet, it fell some 500 feet in a few seconds, caus-
ing the plaintiff, who was belted in, to injure her neck. 25 Find-
ing for the defendant, the jury believed the defendant's
witnesses, all of whom testified that the turbulence was unex-
pected and could not have been avoided.' 26
In Stiles v. National Airlines, 27 an aircraft crashed off the coast
of Alabama losing all of its 41 passengers and crew of five. The
court held that the accident was caused by the airline using dis-
11 See id. at 967.
119 Id. at 968.
120 901 F.2d 621, 622 (7th Cir. 1990).
121 Id. at 622.
122 Id., at 623-24.
123 See id. at 621, 624.
124 214 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1985).
125 See id. at 721-22.
126 Id. at 722.
127 161 F. Supp. 125, 130 (E.D. La. 1958).
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patchers who were not trained in meteorology and incapable of
appreciating turbulent weather conditions and forecasts. The
dispatchers also failed to advise the crew of prior turbulent
weather reports in the vicinity of the accident, and permitted
the flight to proceed in a route that was unsafe for air travel in
light of the known severe turbulent conditions. 12' Therefore,
establishing the negligence of an airline is easier where the tur-
bulence is foreseeable and either could have been avoided or
the passengers could have been forewarned. 12 9
C. THE CONCURRENT DUTIES OF PILOTS AND AIR
TRAFFIc CONTROLLERS
1. There is a delicate marriage between pilots and air traffic
controllers
The duties and responsibilities of every air traffic controller
are defined and circumscribed by the Air Traffic Control Hand-
book, the purpose of which is stated as follows: "Controllers are
required to be familiar with the provisions of this order that per-
tain to their operational responsibilities and to exercise their
best judgment if they encounter situations not covered by it." 3°
As most manuals do, the Air Traffic Control Handbook pro-
ceeds from the general to the specific. Significantly, section 2.2
of the Handbook defines the duties and priorities in the follow-
ing terms:
2-1-2. DUTY PRIORITY
a. Give first priority to separating aircraft and issuing safety alerts
as required in this order. Good judgment shall be used in prioritizing
all other provisions of this order based on the requirements of the
situation at hand.
Note-
Because there are many variables involved, it is virtually impossi-
ble to develop a standard list of duty priorities that would apply
uniformly to every conceivable situation. Each set of circum-
stances must be evaluated on its own merit, and when more than
one action is required, the controllers shall exercise their best judgment
based on the facts and circumstances known to them. That ac-
tion which is most critical from a safety standpoint is performed
first. 131
128 See id.
129 See Ness v. West Coast Airlines, 410 P.2d 965, 969 (Idaho 1965).
130 Ronald E. Morgan, Foreword to AIR TRAFImc CONTROL, supra note 14.
13, Id. at 2-1-2a (emphasis added).
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These provisions lay the groundwork for cases in which the
plaintiff claims the government is at fault for an air crash. Air
traffic controllers must provide accurate information and warn-
ings in accordance with the Air Traffic Control Handbook.132
In some circumstances, an air traffic ccntroller is held to a
superior duty of care to the pilot. In Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc.,1 3 the court determined that the air traffic controllers negli-
gently failed to accurately report current and deteriorating
weather conditions at the airport of the intended landing to the
crew of the aircraft. The trial judge found that the air traffic
controllers' "duty" was properly articulated in the Air Traffic
Control Procedure Manual then in force, which provided:
At locations where official weather reports are obtained by the
controllers through routine procedures and the ceiling and/or
visibility is reported as being at or below the highest "circling
minima" established for the airport concerned, a report of current
weather conditions, and subsequent changes, as necessary, shall be
transmitted as follows: ....
By approach control facilities, to all aircraft at the time of the
first radio contact or as soon as possible thereafter .... 134
The appellate court determined that the words "as necessary" in
the regulation imposed a duty upon air traffic controllers to ad-
vise the crew of the descending aircraft that weather conditions
at the airport were deteriorating. 135
Similarly, in Gill v. United States1 36 the court held that while the
"primary responsibility for the safe operation of the aircraft" be-
longs to the pilot, providing an incomplete or inaccurate report-
ing of weather information will give rise to liability if it is found
to be a "proximate cause of the crash. ' 13' A common law duty to
warn may exist where the controller knows of a danger reason-
ably within his knowledge. 138
The level of care naturally increases in accordance with the
level of danger presented under the circumstances. Conse-
132 See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Ceritos, Cal., 23 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,448,
17,452 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
133 373 F.2d 227, 233 (2d Cir. 1967).
134 Id., at 233 (alteration in original) (quoting FAA, AIR TRAFFFIC CONTROL
PROCEDURES MANUAL § 265.2).
135 See id. at 240.
136 285 F. Supp. 253 (E.D. Tex. 1968) affd, 449 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1971).
137 Id. at 256, 260; see alsoJatkoe v. United States, 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,833
(E.D. Mich. 1985).
138 See Gill, 285 F. Supp. at 260.
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quently, a higher level of care is required when an aircraft is in
immediate and extreme danger, when the controller is in a su-
perior position to judge that danger, when a pilot declares an
emergency or states that he's in distress, or when the pilot has
relied on the controller for certain explicit information.
In a Fifth Circuit wake turbulence case, the court emphasized
that the controllers had a superior duty to warn the pilot of the
danger of wake turbulence because of their superior position
for observing the level of danger to a small aircraft taking off in
the wake of a larger plane.139 When such information is within
the unique knowledge of the air traffic controllers, their failure
to communicate such information may give rise to liability.
In 1974, for example, the Tenth Circuit was quick to affirm
the trial court in finding the government negligent for failing to
warn a pilot of a small aircraft that he was flying too close to a
larger TWA 707jet, and thus was likely to encounter wake turbu-
lence.14 ° The court reasoned:
[T]he pilot Yates was peculiarly susceptible to the control of the
controllers since he was piloting a light plane in between heavy
jets. Once he received and followed the controller's instructions
with respect to landing he was not free to disregard the direc-
tions given and exercise independent initiative. For all practical
purposes, he was in complete control of the tower. The hazard-
ous traffic pattern, the direction which enhanced the danger and
the failure to direct as to turbulence all contributed to the tragic
result."'
Similarly strong language was used in another wake turbu-
lence case in which the Hawaii District Court held the govern-
ment partially at fault:
Discretion and judgment should have been exercised by the con-
trollers to avoid this acute and obvious hazard, whereas [the]
Chief Controller ... emphatically testified that he did not con-
sider that he had any duty, and did not even attempt, to exercise
any judgment or discretion whatsoever, beyond giving the stereo-
typed routine cautionary language of the book. These considera-
tions reinforce this Court's finding of negligence on the part of
the government.1
42
139 See Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d 870, 872 (5th Cir. 1968).
M4 SeeYates. v. United States, 497 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1974).
141 Id. at 883.
142 Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981, 1012 (D. Haw., 1965), affd,
381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967). Note, that the court held the company that gave
10871999]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Similarly, in Hensley v. United States,143 the court determined
that air traffic controllers may be held liable for failing to pro-
vide information that is reasonably apparent to the controller
and not apparent to the pilot when the controller is in a better
position to assess the danger to the pilot.1" The government
has been held responsible in numerous other wake turbulence
cases." ' The government also conceded liability in two cases
arising out of the crash of USAir Flight 1016 on July 2, 1994, in
the United States District Court in Columbia, South Carolina. 146
Air traffic controllers have also been held negligent for failing
to relay weather information that a pilot had requested. 147 A
wealth of cases have held that despite air traffic control negli-
gence, the sole responsibility for an aircrash rests with the pilot.
It is well known that the pilot-in-command is the final authority
regarding the safe conduct of a flight and operation of the air-
craft. The extent of this responsibility is codified in the Federal
Aviation Regulations (FARs). FAR 91.3 provides in pertinent
part:
(a) The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible
for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.
(b) an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot
in command may deviate from any rule of this part to the extent
required to meet that emergency.1 48
The numerous cases addressing this issue demonstrate that
the pilot is the one in charge. Even despite inadequate weather
information from air traffic controllers, courts have often held
that full responsibility for air crashes rests with the pilot as the
final authority. In Hensley, for example, the plane "crashed
shortly after the pilot reported encountering... heavy turbu-
lence. '' 149 Although the personal representatives of the survivors
alleged that the air traffic controllers were negligent in permit-
ting the aircraft to fly into a thunderstorm, or soliciting and pro-
flying instructions to the pilot fifty percent responsible as well for failing to fur-
nish an adequately trained instructor. Id.
143 728 F. Supp. 716 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
144 See id. at 723; see also Hartz 387 F.2d at 873 (superior knowledge of air traffic
controller to evaluate danger of wake turbulence).
145 See, e.g., Neal v. United States, 562 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1977); Dickens v.
United States, 545 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1977).
146 See In re Air Crash at Charlotte, N.C., 982 F. Supp. 1060 (D.S.C. 1996).
147 See, e.g., Springer v. United States, 641 F. Supp. 913 (D.S.C. 1986), affd, 819
F.2d 1139 (4th Cir. 1987).
148 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (1999).
149 Hensley v. United States, 728 F. Supp. 716, 717 (SD. Fla. 1989).
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viding PIREPs, the court found that the pilot was responsible
and that the controllers had not contributed to the crash. 5 °
The Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) teaches pilots
"about the limited ability of air traffic control radar to display
weather data. Pilots are also taught that air traffic control radar
does not depict turbulence."15 ' Pilots have been held responsi-
ble for: continuing to fly into thunderstorms despite adverse
weather advisories; 5 2 flying into forecasted IFR conditions;
5 1
penetrating a storm for over 100 miles; 54 flying into forecasted
deteriorating weather; 55 flying into forecasted IFR condi-
tions; 15 6 flying into cloud-obscured terrain; a57 and failing to ob-
tain a weather briefing and crashing on a VFR flight into
clouds.' 8 Pilots are routinely "regarded as being in the best po-
sition to judge outside conditions."1 59
One of the earliest cases examining the relationship between
a general aviation pilot and air traffic controllers is Kullberg v.
United States.1 60 In Kullberg, the estate of the deceased pilot,
Richard Kullberg, commenced an action alleging that the gov-
ernment had failed to provide adequate weather information
and vectoring services, causing the decedent, a VFR-only pilot,
to fly "inadvertently" into instrument meteorological conditions
(IMC).161 The district court held that the controllers had not
breached any duty to Kullberg because Kullberg continued his
flight in deteriorating conditions, failed to request weather ad-
visories en route, deliberately flew into IMC conditions, and,
150 See id. at 723.
151 Id. at 720. See, e.g., In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, 919 F.2d
1079 (5th Cir. 1991).
152 See Barbosa v. United States, 811 F.2d 1444, 1448 (11th Cir. 1987).
153 See Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222, 227 (9th Cir. 1972).
154 See Black v. United States, 441 F.2d 741, 744-46 (5th Cir. 1971).
155 See Davis v. United States, 643 F. Supp. 67, 77-78 (N.D. Ill. 1986), affd, 824
F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1987).
156 See Lombard v. United States, 601 F. Supp. 10, 12 (E.D. Mo. 1984), affd,
767 F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1985).
157 See Baker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 471, 483-86 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
158 See De Vere v. True-Flite, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 226, 227-28 (E.D.N.C. 1967).
159 Beattie v. United States, 690 F. Supp. 1068, 1077 n.48 (D.D.C. 1988); see also
Brock v. United States, 596 F.2d 93 (4th Cir. 1979); Black v. United States, 441
F.2d at 741 (5th Cir. 1971); American Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180
(5th Cir. 1969).
160 271 F. Supp. 788 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
161 See id. at 789-90.
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although not certified for instrument flight, attempted to fly an
instrument approach.'6
That reasoning was followed by the Fifth Circuit in In re Crash
At Dallas Fort Worth Airport.63 In affirming the district court, the
Fifth Circuit stated: "The [District] Court's finding that the
crew's deliberate decision to land through a known thunder-
storm located at the end of the runway, when they could easily
have gone around, was the sole proximate cause of this disaster
is not clearly erroneous."' 64 The airline claimed that the crash
was caused by the controllers who failed to provide pertinent
weather information. While the Court found the controllers
negligent for failing to relay weather information to the crew, it
held that their negligence was not a proximate cause of the crash.165
V. CONCLUSION
Preparation, as in any litigation, is key. Knowing the prevail-
ing weather conditions, the other data that was or could have
been available to the cabin crew, and the applicable law will en-
able the lawyer to properly and thoroughly handle the turbu-
lence case.
162 See id. at 800.
163 919 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1991).
1-64 See id. at 1088.
165 See id. The district court found that it was negligent for the air traffic con-
trollers not to relay the following: a thunderstorm off the approach end of the
runway threshold; "heavy, heavy rain" (described by witnesses as a curtain of
water) observable from the Tower; cloud to ground lightning strikes; cumulonim-
bus clouds reported to Tower personnel; and radar information showing precipi-
tation on the north end of the runway. See id. at 1085.
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